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 What does it mean to be 'in one's right mind'?  Ordinary 
discourse and the technical languages of the social sciences 
assume that being in one's right mind essentially means that one 
has the ability to calculate how to attain valued ends while 
avoiding injury and opprobriumi.  The calculating rationality 
which utilizes appropriate means to achieve desired ends is 
thought to be known and recognized both by rational subjects 
themselves and by equally rational observers; irrationality, 
then, is an incapacity to calculate, and is revealed in a lack 
of congruence between acts and goals. 
 Anthropologists, as professional iconoclasts, have often 
attempted to demonstrate that assumptions about 'normal' 
consciousness vary according to cultural context; what is 
madness here is sanity there, and vice versa.  This approach is 
especially characteristic of interpretive anthropologists who 
wish to avoid imposing preconceived Western notions of 
rationality on what Clifford Geertz calls 'local knowledge'. 
 However, although the range of goals and methods for 
achieving them has been greatly expanded by an awareness of 
cultural context, the interpretive approach does not really 
offer any significant challenge to the model of rationality 
outlined above, but rather remains grounded in standard 
utilitarian assumptions of rational individual actors 
calculating means to achieve valued ends.  In this paper, I 
argue that a truly radical challenge to the notion of 
rationality already exists within the canon of Western social 
thought in the works of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, as well as 
in the now forgotten writings of crowd psychologists Gustave Le 
Bon and Gabriel Tarde. 
 In the next few pages, I will outline these  
oppositional and radically non-calculative aspects of social 
theory, contrast them with the work of some influential modern 
scholars, and, by means of a discussion of typical recruitment 
mechanisms found in some 'New Age' movements, suggest a few ways 
these classic perspectives might help us to rethink our notions 
of person, agent, and sanity. 
Max Weber and the Irrational 
  It is appropriate to begin with Max Weber, who is the  
predominant figure in the pantheon of modern American sociology 
and anthropology.  For Weber and his orthodox followers 
sociology and anthropology were defined as the effort to reveal 
sympathetically yet systematically the significance of social 
action through exposing the cultural values and norms that 
motivate persons.  This is the famous method of verstehen, or, 
in Geertzian terms, 'taking the native's point of view', and is 
the foundation of interpretive anthropology.  From this 
perspective, the  interpreter reaches 'understanding' by 
realizing the meanings the local actor attaches to his or her 
actions in pursuit of culturally valued goals.  In other words, 
Weberian and Geertzian actors are reasonable, although their 
reasons may not be immediately transparent to an uninitiated 
observer due to cultural and historical differences in value-
systems and in the modes of rationality developed as a 
consequence of these differences. 
 We can see then that Weberian sociology and its modern  
interpretive descendants are approaches to social science that 
fit in well with the model of 'standard' consciousness I 
outlined above: human beings are assumed to be rational agents 
acting consciously and intelligently to maximize their valued 
goals; their thought is recognizable as reasonable by the 
thinker as well as by the culturally knowledgeable observer; 
furthermore, rationality is highly valued within its particular 
cultural setting, since only rational action can lead to 
attainment of culturally desirable ends.  The contribution of 
interpretive social science, in the Weberian and Geertzian 
sense, is thus to reveal the rationality of apparent 
irrationality through supplying "the interpretive understanding 
of social action and thereby... a causal explanation of its 
course and consequences" (Weber 1978: 4). 
 For Weber, this approach, in which the point of view of  
the other is taken in order to display the underlying intent and 
purpose of social action for that other is the sole mode of 
inquiry proper to the social sciences.  According to Weber, such 
a limitation of the possibilities of sociology is necessary 
because sociologists (and, by extension, anthropologists) are 
products and purveyors of rational analytic thought and can only 
practise their craft in this mode.  Even more crucial, however, 
is Weber's fundamental contention that any action orientation in 
which the actors' motives and goals are not self-consciously 
determined is outside the realm of meaning, therefore 
unintelligible, and as such must be excluded from the central 
interpretive task of social theory.  
 But although Weber specifically excludes all  
irrational, unconscious, and purely reactive activity from the 
realm of theory and accordingly devotes himself to explicating 
the types of rationality that 'make sense' of other cultures and 
historical epochs, he himself was well aware that a great deal 
of human life - indeed, most of human life - is not experienced 
by self-conscious agents acting for achieving valued goals 
within coherent 'webs of meaning'.  Weber therefore breaks 
action orientations down into four ideal types ii .  Two of these 
types - value rationality and instrumental rationality - are 
different forms of calculating consciousness based upon the 
rationality of the actoriii and in most of his major writing 
Weber elaborates their distinctions and evolution.  The other 
two types of action orientation, however, are deemed by Weber to 
be without any purpose or meaning whatsoever, and thereby to 
stand outside the range of social theory.   These types are 
tradition and charisma 
 Tradition is defined by Weber as "on the other side" of  
the borderline between meaningful and irrational action (Weber 
1978: 25), since for him tradition ideally implies an automatic 
and unthinking repetition by the actor enmeshed within the 
confines of a mindless swarm; it is a state of torpor, lethargy 
and inertia, predictable and mechanical, reproducing itself in 
utter indifference and submerging the creative individualities 
of all persons caught within its coilsiv.  Here, Weber gives us a 
picture of mundane life governed by routine; a world of the 
passive crowd in which rational self-consciousness and goal-
orientation has no part to play. 
 Yet, although tradition is sociologically unanalyzable  
in principle, Weber nonetheless notes that action motivated by 
habit and thoughtless conformity is hardly unusual.  Instead, he 
writes that "in the great majority of cases actual action goes 
on in a state of inarticulate half-consciousness or actual 
unconsciousness of its subjective meaning" (Weber 1978: 21)  and 
that the "bulk of all everyday action" is motivated by "an 
almost automatic reaction to habitual stimuli" (Weber 1978: 25).  
Weber freely acknowledges such "merely reactive imitation may 
well have a degree of sociological importance at least equal to 
that of the type which can be called social action in the strict 
sense" (Weber 1978: 24). 
  Of even greater importance is charisma, which stands in  
absolute contrast to tradition.  In its simplest form, charisma 
is defined by Weber as "a certain quality of an individual 
personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary 
and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least 
specifically exceptional powers or qualities" (Weber 1978: 242).  
Individuals possessing charisma are portrayed by Weber as above 
all else emotional and vitalizing, in complete opposition both 
to the ennervating authority of the patriarch and the rational 
efficiency of the technician-bureaucrat.  Instead, whatever the 
charismatic leader says is right not because it makes sense, or 
because it coincides with what has always been done, but because 
the leader says it.  Orders can therefore be completely 
whimsical, self-contradictory and even lead to death or 
destruction for the follower, demonstrating the disciple's inner 
emotional compulsion to obey without regard for coherence or 
consequence. 
 The extraordinary figures who inspire such unreasoning  
devotion are imagined by Weber to be, in their typical form, 
berserk warriors, pirates and demagogues.  They reveal their 
capacities through a highly intensified and emotionally labile 
state of consciousness that excites and awes the onlookers, and 
jolts them from the everydayv.   The primary type, from which the 
others spring, is the epileptoid magician-shaman who can 
incorporate the Gods and display divine powers primarily through 
convulsions, trembling and intense effusions of excitement 
(Weber 1972: 327, 1978: 401)vi.  Through his capacity for 
epileptoid states, the  shaman served both as an exemplar of 
ecstasy and as the leader in the rituals of communal 
intoxication and orgy Weber took as the original sacred 
experience (Weber 1978: 401, 539). 
 Why should such manifestations of apparent abnormality  
appeal to an audience?  It is not intuitively obvious that a 
display of epileptoid behavior would be attractive to anyone; in 
our society quite the contrary is the case.  But Weber 
postulated that extreme emotional states, such as those 
generated in seizures and other forms of emotionally heightened 
altered states of consciousness, had a contagious effect, 
spreading through the audience and infecting its members with 
corresponding sensations of enhanced emotionality and vitality; 
these expansive sensation are felt to be emanating from the 
stimulating individual, who is then attributed with superhuman 
powersvii.  The charismatic appeal therefore lies precisely in 
the capacity of a person to display heightened emotionality and 
in the reciprocal capacity of the audience to imitation and 
corresponding sensations of altered awareness.  
 Thus for Weber, what is essential and compulsive in the  
charismatic relation is not its meaning, though explanatory 
meaning systems will certainly be generated after the factviii.  
Rather, it is the participatory communion engendered by the 
epileptoid performance of the charismatic which experientially 
and immediately releases the onlookers from their mundane 
sufferings.   "For the devout the sacred value, first and above 
all, has been a psychological state in the here and now.  
Primarily this state consists in the emotional attitude per se;" 
an attitude in which the following could momentarily escape from 
themselves by dissolving in "the objectless acosmism of love" 
(Weber 1972: 278, 330 emphasis in original) ix.  For Weber, such 
prophets provided the creative force in history; only through 
their inspiration could enough energy and commitment be 
generated to overturn an old social order.  They are the heroes 
and saints who, he feared, could no longer be born in the 
rationalized world of modern societyx.   
 To recapitulate, we have then in Weber two forms of  
altered or dissociated states of consciousness that, from his 
point of view, are not amenable to sociological analysis since 
they stand outside rational goal-orientation, yet are 
nonetheless of crucial importance in history and culture.  In 
fact, the question of what these states are altered or 
dissociated from becomes a difficult question to answer, since 
Weber sees the predominance of the rational 'standard' 
consciousness to be a relatively recent development.  Perhaps, 
instead, it is more appropriate to say that rationality itself, 
especially in its modern instrumental version, is an altered 
state, vis-a-vis its powerful predecessors of tradition and 
charisma. 
The Rationalization of Irrationality 
 But these opposites also continually transform one into  
the other in a continuous dialectic, and they move as well 
through history toward their own supercession by more  rational 
modes of thought.  Charisma occurs, Weber says, when tradition 
has lost its hold and people no longer feel compelled to repeat 
the old patterns, obey the old orders.  Charismatic revolutions 
themselves are destined to be short-lived, and necessarily have 
a new tradition nascent within them; ritualization and 
bureacratization inevitably appear as the prophet's original 
vitalizing revelation is repeated and institutionalized by his 
self-interested followers, who wish to cloak themselves with the 
sacred transformative quality originally imputed to the personal 
aura of the leader himself.  This type of charisma supports the 
new traditions born of the original prophesy; but now the crown, 
the throne, the robe, instead of being the accoutrements of the 
ecstatic prophet, may legitimize a moribund time server.  
Charisma in this instance becomes co-terminus with tradition, 
justifying and validating the habitual obedience of the massesxi.  
From this perspective, tradition too changes in character, 
losing its irrational somnambulistic component to become a 
coherent framework within which free agents actively and 
rationally pursue the given values and goals elaborated by the 
prophet and his minions.  In other words, both charisma and 
tradition become rationalized as they transform from their 
ideal-typical state. 
 Weber's conceptualization of this process has had great  
influence upon his American followers.  But where Weber placed 
the primary forms of charisma and tradition outside the 
boundaries of social thought, while still giving them credit as 
the precursors of rationality, his successors have tried to make 
them disappear completely by incorporating them within their 
systematic meaning-centered theories.  Thus the influential 
sociologist Edward Shils claims that an innate human quest for a 
coherent and meaningful way of understanding the world is the 
sacred heart of every viable social formation.  Therefore, it 
follows that "the charismatic propensity is a function of the 
need for order" (Shils 1965:203) and that charisma is felt 
automatically whenever one draws near the entities and 
institutions thought to embody and emanate that order.  
Tradition can then be understood as located precisely within the 
same order-giving central structures in which charisma inheres; 
structures that, far from being irrational, provide a sacred and 
coherent model for living a meaningful life.  Shil's paradigm is 
explicitly followed by Clifford Geertz, who argues for "the 
inherent sacredness of sovereign power" (1983: 123), and 
proceeds to analyze the manner in which this supposed sovereign, 
meaning-giving central power is manifested in various cultural 
frameworks.  
 These neo-Weberian perspectives have erased the image  
of charisma as an irrational emotional convulsion.  Instead, all 
persons in all societies at all times are attempting, with 
greater or lesser success, to promote and to attain a culturally 
given sacred central symbolic system of accepted significance, 
as revealed in concrete institutional forms.  The only human 
problem is not being able to achieve  proximity to this holy 
order.  From within this framework, the frenzy of the shaman is 
transformed into a reasonable search for coherence and 
significance, and tradition and charisma become equivalent to 
rationalityxii. 
 Obviously, this version of society is far from the  
social and historical concept of irrational action that Weber 
knew, revealed, and set aside as ineffable and thus outside of 
sociological discourse.  Weber certainly could not have accepted 
the reduction of charisma and tradition to 'sacred order'.  For 
him, the primary form of tradition remained imitative and 
senseless, and the primary form of charisma remained convulsive, 
revolutionary, and outside of 'meaning' entirely.  The best that 
sociology could do, from his perspective, was to recognize the 
capacity of these irrational impulses to influence a rational 
course of action, and thereby to "assess the causal significance 
of irrational factors in accounting for the deviations from this 
type" (Weber 1978: 6)xiii.  
Durkheim and Group Consciousness 
 Let me turn now to Emile Durkheim, the other great  
ancestor of contemporary social thought, whose work offers what 
I believe to be a more theoretically compelling understanding of 
the irrational than does Weber.  However,  Durkheim's concern 
with grasping irrational states of being is now more or less 
forgotten or else the object of misunderstanding and derisionxiv.  
Instead, he is known today primarily as he was interpreted by 
Talcott Parsons, ie., as a systematic thinker strongly 
associated with functionalism and with his pioneering use of 
statistical data to isolate variables for the purposes of 
demonstrating causal chains in social organizations.  Here his 
great contributions are his dissection of the division of labor 
and its consequences, and his correlation of suicide rates with 
alienating social conditions.   His other great project, one 
which strongly influenced later structuralism, was his effort to 
demonstrate that categories of thought are themselves social 
products, and thereby to ground Kantian metaphysical imperatives 
in a structured social reality. 
 But these are only a part of Durkheim's sociology.  In  
contrast to the Weberian concern with conscious agents 
struggling to achieve culturally mediated goals and values, 
Durkheim founded his sociology on the notion that ordinary 
consciousness is characterized more by rationalization than by 
rationality.  For him, the reasons people claim to have for what 
they are doing and the meanings they attribute to their actions 
are post facto attempts to explain  socially generated 
compulsions which they actually neither understand nor control.  
 Thus Durkheim, unlike Weber, draws a radical  
distinction between the goals and character of the group and the 
goals and characters of the individuals within the group, 
arguing that "social psychology has its own laws that are not 
those of individual psychology" (1966: 312).  Furthermore, "the 
interests of the whole are not necessarily the interests of the 
part" (Durkheim 1973: 163); indeed,  they may be, and often are, 
completely at odds.  But the group imposes its own will upon the 
hearts and minds of its members and compels them to act in ways 
that run against their own subjective interests; these actions 
are later rationalized to 'make sense', and the rationalizations 
then become the value systems of a particular human society.  
 Durkheim therefore presents us with the extraordinary  
proposal that sociology cannot take as its subject the 
individual person who is manipulating within culture to maximize 
his or her own ends.  Rather, he proposes a continuous 
conflictual ebb and flow between singularity and community, self 
and groupxv.  As he writes, "our inner life has something like a 
double center of gravity.  On the one hand is our individuality 
- and, more particularly, our body in which it is based; on the 
other it is everything in us that expresses something other than 
ourselves.... (These) mutually contradict and deny each other" 
(1973: 152) xvi.  
 Durkheim, like Weber, envisions the individual to be  
rationally calculating and maximizing.  But far from assuming 
this form of consciousness to be the nexus of society or of 
sociology, Durkheim repudiates egoistic calculation as immoral, 
solipsistic, depraved, animalistic, and of no sociological 
interest.  Instead, he argues that human beings rise above 
animality and pure appetite precisely at the point where the 
'normal' mind of the self-aggrandizing egoistic actor is 
immersed and subdued within the transformative grip of the 
socialxvii. 
 Durkheim's vision of the selfish actor dissolved within  
the crucible of society appears to parallel to Weber's image of 
tradition as a state of deindividuated trance. But there is a 
very significant difference between the two, which derives from 
Durkheim's understanding of the experience of group 
consciousness.  Where for Weber the state of unthinking 
immersion in the group is associated with torpor and lethargy, 
Durkheim argues instead that people submerge themselves in the 
collective precisely because participation offers an immediate 
felt sense of transcendence to its members.   It is a sensation 
of ecstasy, not boredom, that experientially validates self-loss 
in the community.  
 Influenced by studies of Mesmerismxviii and the same notions 
of emotional excitability that Weber also utilized, Durkheim 
thought that an extraordinary altered state of consciousness 
among individuals in a group, which he called 'collective 
effervescence' would occur spontaneously "whenever people are 
put into closer and more active relations with one another" 
(Durkheim 1965: 240-1).  This experience is one of 
depersonalization, and of a transcendent sense of participation 
in something larger and more powerful than themselvesxix.  
Durkheim, ordinarily a placid writer, paints a potent picture of 
this state, as the personal ego momentarily disintegrates under 
the influence of the fevered crowd.  "The passions released are 
of such an impetuosity that they can be restrained by 
nothing.... Everything is just as though he really were 
transported into a special world, entirely different from the 
old one where he  ordinarily lives, and into an environment 
filled with exceptionally intense forces that take hold of him 
and metamorphose him" (Durkheim 1965: 246, 249). 
 Durkheim imagines that within the excited mass, sensations 
of emotional intensification are released in impulsive outbursts 
that contagiously spread to those around.  From this point of 
view, charisma exists only in the group; the charismatic leader 
who is Weber's hero is here a passive symbol serving, in Elias 
Canetti's words, as a 'crowd crystal' around whom the collective 
can solidify and resonate (Canetti 1978)xx.  The result of this 
solidification is immediate imitation, magnified through the 
lens of the leader and synchronized within the group as a whole.  
In a feedback loop, this echoing and magnifying serves to 
further heighten emotion, leading to greater challenges to the 
ego and more potent feelings of exaltation. After this ecstatic 
experience "men really are more confident because they feel 
themselves stronger: and they really are stronger, because 
forces which were languishing are now reawakened in the 
consciousness"(Durkheim 1965: 387). 
 The physical experience of self-loss and intoxication in 
the crowd's collective effervescence is, for Durkheim, the "very 
type of sacred thing" (Durkheim 1965: 140) and is the ultimate 
and permanent source of social cohesion; all else is secondary.  
Thus he writes that what is necessary for social life "is that 
men are assembled, that sentiments are felt in common and 
expressed in common acts; but the particular nature of these 
sentiments and acts is something relatively secondary and 
contingent" (1965: 431-2).    
 Tradition, from this perspective, is not seen as a torpid 
counter to the excitement of charisma, as in the Weberian model.  
Instead, a viable tradition is understood as suffused with the 
ecstatic experience of regular collective participation.  Thus 
Durkheim conflates charisma and tradition in a manner completely 
the reverse of Shils and Geertz.  For Durkheim, any attribution 
of meaning to the felt reality of collective effervescence is 
strictly a posteriori; an attempt by individuals try to explain 
and rationalize what is actually a primal, prelogical, 
experiential state of transcendent self-loss that provides the 
felt moral basis for all social configurations, and combats the 
solipsistic self-interest that would tear society apart. 
Crowd Psychology  
 Durkheim's positive moral view of group consciousness and  
Weber's favorable portrait of charismatic relations were 
completely overturned in the early 20th century by the crowd 
psychologists Gustave Le Bon and Gabriel Tarde.  These two 
French theorists, though now largely forgotten by academics, 
were tremendously influential in their time, and were the 
founders of the present-day practices of political polling and 
media consultation as well as the esoteric study  of group 
psychology.  For them the collective experience no longer had 
any redemptive features, and became instead a frightful 
combination of chaos, credulity and passion as persons within 
the crowd automatically regress to more primitive, child-like 
states of being while under the influence of their irrational, 
emotionally-compelling leaderxxi. 
 In this formulation, the 'standard' state of rational 
consciousness, which Le Bon and Tarde both quite explicitly took 
to be the consciousness of a masculine, calculating, utilitarian 
free agent, was fragile indeed.  Indeed, though lauding 
rationality as the highest form of thought, the crowd 
psychologists, like Weber, were suspicious of the extent to 
which rational consciousness actually prevailed.   Tarde, for 
example, believed that people, though imagining themselves to be 
free agents acting for understood goals, are in truth 
"unconscious puppets whose strings were pulled by their 
ancestors or political leaders or prophets" (1903:77).  From 
this perspective, men and women, insofar as they are members of 
a group, are "in a special state, which much resembles the state 
of fascination in which the hypnotized individual finds himself 
in the hands of the hypnotiser"(Le Bon 1952: 31). 
 In this vision, even the most rational individual ran great 
risk of being quickly and irresistibly reduced to the lowest 
common denominator when immersed in a crowd, and consequently of 
acting in a savage, childish, 'feminine' and, in short, 
irrational manner that would never be condoned by ordinary 
standards of behavior.  Rational consciousness, then, is 
portrayed and appreciated by these thinkers as a feeble refuge 
from the torrents of passion and destruction that seethe within 
the collective; a torrent that drowns all who are drawn into its 
vortexxxii.  The Durkheimian view of the power of the collective 
is here completely accepted, but this power is allowed only a 
negative moral content, while the good is found solely in the 
flimsy boat of rationality.  
 For the crowd psychologists, as for Durkheim, the 
mechanisms that stimulate the crowd are simple.  Once a mass is 
gathered, any strong action excites immediate imitation and 
magnification in a cycle of intensification that eventually dies 
down, much like the ripples that appear  after a stone is thrown 
into a pool.  Only through such stimulation can human beings 
attain "the illusion of will" (Tarde 1903:77)xxiii.  So, where 
Durkheim believed the primal group would coalesce spontaneously 
without the necessity of any external excitement, crowd 
psychology argued that someone had to throw the stone and 
provide the "dream of command" that stimulates the crowd to 
unite in pursuit of "a dream of action"(Tarde 1903: 77).  
 In postulating the need for a leader to galvanize the 
group, Le Bon and Tarde brought together Durkheimian and 
Weberian imagery.  But where Weber had given the charismatic a 
positive value as the founder of new religions and the healer of 
the dispirited, Le Bon and Tarde see him in  negative guise as a 
powerful and willful figure; a mesmerist who is capable of 
expressing in his person the electrifying excitement and 
volition that awakens the sleeping crowd, providing the masses 
with an irresistible command that solidifies and motivates them 
under his thrallxxiv.  The inner character of this leader 
remained an enigma; far from a rational calculator, he is 
"recruited from the ranks of those morbidly nervous, excitable, 
half-deranged persons who are bordering on madness" (Le Bon 
1952: 132).  In particular, he had to be "obsessed" by an idea 
that "has taken possession of him", in a way exactly parallel to 
the possession of the shaman by a god or gods (Le Bon 1952: 
118).  The crowd psychologists argue that it is precisely the 
leader's obsessive self-absorption that appeals to the crowd, 
since only through feeling himself pulled and formed by forces 
beyond his control does the leader gain the power to act and 
thereby break the cycle of imitation and passivity that has held 
the collective in a somnambulistic stuporxxv. 
 In the paradigm offered by crowd psychology, such persons 
elicit not only obedience, but also the love and adulation of 
the followers.  By standing apart, completely focused on an 
inner vision which compels and energizes them, they embody and 
exemplify the "dream of command" that electrifies the following.  
So we have the paradox of a leader who, far from wishing to 
further the ends of his followers, instead "in perfect egotism 
offered himself to (their) adoration" (Tarde 1903: 203).  The 
crowd psychologists thus come to the pessimistic conclusion that 
the group's devotion has "never been bestowed on easy-going 
masters, but on the tyrants who vigorously oppressed them" in 
order to serve their own driven obsessions (Le Bon 1952: 54).  
 Crowd psychology therefore unites Durkheim and Weber by 
placing an ecstatic and convulsive charismatic at the center of 
a receptive group.  The state of torpor that Weber saw in 
tradition is here understood as the somnambulistic trance that 
precedes charismatic involvement in a state of collective 
effervescence.  The moral quality of crowd participation and 
charismatic excitement is now also reversed.  Where Durkheim 
portrayed the vitality of society arising from communal 
experiences of unity, and where Weber hoped for the arrival of a 
transformative new prophet who could break open the iron cage of 
instrumental rationality, crowd psychology gives us frightening 
imagery of both groups and leaders; imagery that points not 
toward the church and the prophet, but toward Nazism and Hitler.   
As Le Bon prophetically writes, as a consequence of the erosion 
of traditional bonds of kinship, ethnicity and religion that 
kept the regression to mass consciousness at bay, "the age we 
are about to enter will in truth be the ERA OF CROWDS" 
(1952:14). 
The Denial of Charisma 
 In so demonizing the altered states of charisma and group 
participation, crowd psychology prefigures the modern attitude, 
though unlike modern writers, the crowd  psychologists retained 
a fearful appreciation of the potency of group consciousness.  
But this appreciation has been repressed by the efforts by 
Shils, Geertz and others of the interpretive school who aim to 
transform the charismatic appeal of the leader and the 
convulsive reaction of the group into a rational quest for 
meaning, order and coherence.  In a parallel manner, 'resource 
mobilization' theorists of mass movements have argued that 
activist groups are made up of purposive and reasonable 
individual free agents voluntarily gathered together for the 
sake of commonly held goals of social justice. And, similarly, 
social constructivist theories of emotion portray emotion as  
'cognitive,' and therefore consider emotions primarily as 
'embodied appraisals'.  
 I want to be clear here that I do not dispute the salience 
of a search for meaning, coherence, and justice as causes for 
commitment to any movement; and certainly emotions are cognized 
(to be afraid of a cut electrical wire one must know that it is 
dangerous).  But the feeling person, overwhelmed by nameless 
anxiety, immersed in the vortex of a mob, or irresistibly drawn 
to a charismatic figure like a moth to a flame, is hardly a 
rational calculator.  The image of free agents making reasonable 
appraisals of risks, enacting values, construing meaningful 
systems and pursuing desired outcomes within a coherent cultural 
context is a vision of humanity that may be appropriate for 
understanding a great proportion of action and thought; but 
clearly the apotheosis of rationalization and voluntarism found 
in these contemporary theories ignores precisely the aspects of 
social behavior that Weber, Durkheim and the crowd psychologists 
sought to bring to the fore; i.e., the power of irrational group 
experience to stimulate men and women into actions that can only 
be called meaningful, orderly, and goal-oriented if these terms 
are emptied of all content.   
  Why has this denial of the irrational psychology of groups 
and leaders occurred?  In part, the assertion of human 
reasonableness under even the most extraordinary circumstances 
can be considered an intellectual reaction to the implications 
of the horrible spectre of Nazism that the crowd psychologists 
so uncannily prophesiedxxvi.  But it is also clear that the 
denial of collective deindividuating altered states of 
consciousness corresponds with our present social formation, 
which mirrors and ratifies the rationalization processes of the 
society at large and finds its most powerful philosophical 
expression in the romantic existentialist apotheosis of the 
selfxxvii.  Because this model holds sway, a positive moral 
evaluation of collective charismatic states will be very 
difficult to achieve, as will the experience of charisma itself.   
Charisma Today: est and Scientology 
 I can illustrate my pointxxviii by sketching the trajectory 
of two apparently pragmatic and "world affirming"xxix charismatic 
groups: est, founded and led by Werner Erhard and Scientology, 
founded and led by the late L. Ron Hubbardxxx.   In their stated 
purposes, these two groups appear highly instrumental, charging 
a substantial fee to help people to achieve better adjustment at 
work, new friends, greater happiness, a more satisfying love 
life. They have a strong continuity with the 'healthy-minded' 
'once-born' religions that William James (1982) found so 
characteristic of American culture; religions which typically 
affirm the goodness of all creation and preach accommodation 
with the world as it is, attracting middle-class, white collar 
adherents anxious to better themselves.  The est Forum, for 
instance, stresses that its program is suited to "the already 
successful... the already healthy...the already committed...the 
already accomplished...the already knowledgeable" (Forum 
pamphlet 1986).   The purpose of joining is to learn a practice 
allowing one to manipulate "the levers and controls of personal 
effectiveness, creativity, vitality and satisfaction" (Forum 
pamphlet 1986); and testimonials from converts make claims not 
to higher wisdom, but rather that the discipline "has helped me 
to handle life better.... I get on better with people.... I can 
apply myself to work and study more easily than before" (Foster 
1971: 119).   Successful graduates are "people who know how to 
make life work" (Erhard quoted in Brewer 1975: 36). 
 In the pragmatic, cheerful 'once born' ethos, the desire 
for personal enlightenment is reconciled with practical action, 
doing well in the office becomes a pathway to self-fulfillment, 
and accepting hierarchy is understood not only as a useful 
strategy in business, but also as a spiritual exercise, since 
"you get power by giving power to a source of power" (Erhard 
quoted in Tipton 1982: 215).  Armed with new perceptions, the 
trainees can acquiesce to whatever situation they find 
themselves in, confident that "being with it makes it disappear" 
(an est trainer, quoted in Tipton 1982: 209); that whatever one 
is doing is what one wants to do, and that the world is good and 
just.   "Everyone of us is a god in his own universe, and the 
creator of the very reality around ourselves" (an est trainer, 
quoted in Singh 1987: 10).   As Ellwood remarks, from this 
perspective "an individual only gets into traps and 
circumstances he intends to get into.... the limitations he has 
must have been invented by himself" (1973: 175). 
 In keeping with the practical, work-oriented manifest 
content of this ideology, most participants have little 
involvement in any particular spiritual technology, judging 
efficacy, like any good consumer, solely by perceived results.  
They are, in Bird's (1979) terminology, apprentices rather than 
devotees or disciples; persons merely looking for helpful 
knowledge in a complicated mystic marketplace. 
 Yet, despite their overtly instrumental character, 
utilitarian orientation, and constantly shifting peripheral 
membership, these groups paradoxically appear to have a strong 
tendency to develop highly committed charismatized inner cores 
of intensely loyal devotees gathered around a  leader taken to 
be a demigod.  As Roy Wallis puts it, "social reality outside 
the movement may come to seem a pale and worthless reflection of 
the social reality of the movement.... (as) the self and 
personal identity... become subordinated to the will and 
personality of the leader" (Wallis 1984: 122-24).  
 In Scientology, for instance, there was a "transformation 
from a loose, almost anarchic group of enthusiasts of a lay 
psychotherapy, Dianetics, to a tightly controlled and rigorously 
disciplined following for a quasi-religious movement, 
Scientology" (Wallis 1977:5).  L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of 
this group, began as a science fiction writer and entrepreneur, 
but ended by claiming to be a Messiah "wearing the boots of 
responsibility for this universe" (Hubbard quoted in Ellwood 
1973: 172).  His disciples concurred, seeing him as a 
charismatic superman who could escape space and time, and whose 
insight into the world would lead to universal salvation. 
 For the inner cadre of Scientologists the 'meaning' of 
membership did not hinge on a coherent doctrine, since Hubbard 
"modified the doctrine frequently without precipitating 
significant opposition" (Wallis 1977: 153). As a result, "even 
the most doctrinally learned Scientologists may be unsure what 
palpable qualities a clear (an enlightened person) is supposed 
to manifest, other than confidence and loyalty to the cult" 
(Bainbridge and Stark 1980: 133).  Participation rested instead 
on absolute faith in Hubbard himself and on one's total 
unreserved commitment to the organization.  As a former convert 
writes, "the extent of one's faith was the measure of one's 
future gains.... Everything depended on one's own certainty at 
the moment" (Kaufman 1972: 25, 179).  Any questioning showed one 
was not moving toward 'clear', whereas meditation on Hubbard's 
often self-contradictory words was considered to be 
transformative in itself. 
 In the fully formed Scientology corporation a multi-million 
dollar enterprise was headed by a small, secretive, highly 
disciplined and fully committed central cadre, the Sea Org, 
marked by their esoteric practices, special language, and 
distinctive uniforms of white, with black boots and belt.  
Totally dedicated to Hubbard, they formed an inner circle of 
virtuosi living in seclusion aboard Hubbard's yacht, proclaiming 
their devotion by signing 'billion year contracts' of spiritual 
service to their eternal leader. 
 As the group made claims to have the key, not simply to 
enhanced awareness, but to all the world's problems, it also 
became more rigid and totalitarian; fear of 'suppressives' 
(Scientology language for opponents) heightened, leading to 
expensive lawsuits and countersuits; meanwhile Hubbard himself 
withdrew deeper into paranoia, eventually isolating himself so 
that only three people were actually permitted to see him, and 
it became a matter of controversy whether he was alive or 
deadxxxi. 
 Est has followed a similar trajectory.  Beginning as the 
revelation of a former encyclopedia salesman and  ex-Scientology 
convert, est brought together the techniques of Scientology, 
Buddhist meditation, existential philosophy and group therapy to 
form a potent self-help organization which soon began to exhibit 
a charismatic character.  Werner Erhard, the founder, was 
idolized by his committed followers as a "fully realized human 
being" who "lives in risk and possibility... we catch up with 
him, then he moves ten steps ahead" (a convert quoted in Singh 
1987: 89).  An inner circle of devotees controlling the vast est 
empire were absolutely loyal to Erhard, whom they conceived to 
be a savior.  This inner circle was tightly knit, strictly 
regulated, and required to have only "those purposes, desires, 
objectives, and intentions that Werner agreed for you to have" 
(the president of est, quoted in Martin 1980: 112).  Not 
coincidentally, they began to resemble Erhard closely, down to 
mannerisms and dress.  
 The accommodative est message of "perfection as a state in 
which things are the way the are, and not the way they are not" 
(Erhard quoted in Martin 1980: 114) was taken by the inner 
circle to be a message that would transform the world through 
transforming consciousness, and est began to reorient itself 
into a more overtly religious salvationist direction, with 
Erhard as the prophet of the coming millennium.  But the 
pressure of being a charismatic figure began to tell on Erhard, 
who showed signs of psychological disintegration, brutalizing 
members of his family and the inner core while simultaneously 
demanding greater and more violent tests of loyalty from those 
closest to him. The ensuing tension led, in recent years, to 
defections and litigation within the core, and to public attacks 
on Erhard by some of his closest relatives and associatesxxxii. 
 The parallel descents of these groups into paranoia and 
authoritarianism are instructive, and illustrate the 
difficulties even the most accommodative charismatic movements 
and leaders have in adapting to modern social conditions.  They 
also illustrate recurrent patterns of group processes that are 
not reducible to a quest for meaning or coherence or any other 
rational end, but that can better be conceptualized within a 
framework of charisma, collective effervescence, and the 
psychology of crowds.  The same framework can help us to 
understand the methods of recruitment that drew people deeply 
into these organizationsxxxiii.  
 Essentially, recruitment to est and Scientology, in common 
with recruitment to many other modern cults, relies on 
techniques that reveal to the prospective clients the degree to 
which their personal identities are contingent and socially 
constructed.  The stated end is to permit the convert to escape 
from obligations of should and ought (referred to as 'garbage') 
in order to find the authentic, eternal and vital selves that 
lie beneath social and familial conditioning.  
 The notion of a primal unsocialized vital center is taken 
absolutely literally by Scientology.  In its doctrine, human 
beings are actually concrete emanations of timeless  energy 
forces called Thetans, who manifested themselves in the material 
world for amusement, but who have been so absorbed in their 
games that they have forgotten their true transcendent 
identities.  To remedy this unhappy condition, one must 'clear' 
material residues and memories away from Thetan consciousness 
and allow the Thetan to "relinquish his self-imposed 
limitations" (Hubbard quoted in Wallis 1977: 104). 
 The fantastic science fiction ideology would hardly be 
convincing to many potential converts without its experiential 
ratification through a long process of training in which the new 
member's sense of identity and social context is consistently 
undermined via a bewildering, repetitious and emotionally 
charged sequence of 'deprogramming' exercises ('auditing') which 
utilize a fallacious instrument (the 'e-meter') that students 
believe registers fluctuations in their emotional responses (see 
Whitehead 1987 for a detailed account).  
 In the training, the student, under the eye of an 
experienced 'auditor', may be asked repeatedly to relive and 
repeat painful or intense experiences of the past.  The auditor 
asks questions such as "tell me something you would be willing 
to have that person (indicated by the trainer) not know about 
you", over and over again.  No explanations are given, and the 
trainee is also constantly obliged to redefine the most common 
words and phrases he or she uses in response, and is required as 
well to master the complex Scientology jargon.  The 'runs' of 
repeated questions and answers can go for many hours, confusing 
and exhausting the trainee.  The ostensible aim of this ritual 
is to distance the trainee from emotional reactions to 'garbage' 
so he or she can become 'at cause' by getting a 'clear' reading 
on the e-meter.  In consequence of this process, the trainee 
will hypothetically become free to experience unencumbered 
ecstatic Thetan awareness.  
 The training process occurs in an atmosphere of high 
anxiety, as the trainee struggles to control the random 
fluctuations of the e-meter while simultaneously feelings of 
disorientation, remorse, hatred, love, jealousy and so on are 
elicited by the repetitious, probing, highly personal questions 
and complex demands of the auditor, a powerful authority figure 
believed to have achieved a more evolved superhuman 
consciousness.  Each auditing session concludes with cathartic 
group gatherings in which the participants 'share wins' and 
"were warmly welcomed into the group, greeted and applauded" 
(Wallis 1977: 173).  This sequence proved to be remarkably 
effective in gaining great loyalty from many Scientology 
'preclears', who would themselves move up the elaborate ladder 
toward 'clear' status and become 'auditors' of other 
initiatesxxxiv. 
 Est never utilized such a literal image of liberation as 
Scientology's Thetan, but very similar techniques were in 
operation in the recruitment and training process.  For est, as 
in Scientology, history and family are considered to be 
destructively enmeshing, and the point of training is to be  
released "from the cultural trance, the systematic self-
delusion, to which most of us surrender our aliveness" (Marsh 
1975: 38).  The process is conceived as awakening to one's 
timeless and vital transpersonal essence, thus becoming "truly 
able and perfect" (an est trainer, quoted in Tipton 1982: 177).  
As in Scientology, trainees cannot break through into this 
perfect realm by reason; reason is regarded as a defense against 
the intrinsic and immediate truth of intuitive feeling states.  
"If you experience it, it's the truth.  The same thing believed 
is a lie" (Erhard, quoted in Tipton 1982: 192). 
 As in Scientology, instruction is geared to break down 
the students' reasoning power and 'conditioning' through 
emotionally charged training sessions designed to demonstrate 
that their beliefs and personalities are programmed by their 
past, their culture, and their associations.  In the classical 
est seminar, 250 persons or so spend two weekends totalling 60 
to 70 emotionally intense (and expensive) hours of lectures, 
meditation and confrontation.  The trainer typically abuses and 
infantilizes the group, calling them 'assholes' whose lives are 
'shit', and prohibiting them from using the toilet.  The 
students are further bombarded by paradoxes undercutting 
logicxxxv, asked to relive traumatic emotional experiences of the 
past, incited to act out deep fears, or perhaps insulted and 
abused by the leader in front of the audience for arrogance or 
selfishness.  Role playing, switching genders, taking on other 
identities, all are part of the repertoire. The effectiveness of 
these efforts to decenter the self in the context of the group 
is evident in one participant's description: "It seems now that 
almost the entire roomful of people are crying, moaning, 
groaning, sobbing, screaming, shouting, writhing. 'Stop it! Stop 
it!'  'No! No! No!'  'I didn't do it!  I didn't do it!'  
'Please....'  'Help!'  'Daddy, daddy, daddy....'  The groans, 
the crying, the shouts reinforce each other; the emotions pour 
out of the trainees" (quoted in Martin 1980: 123). 
   These methods are quite typical, and involve what Harriet 
Whitehead (1987) has called 'renunciation,' that is, a 
dedifferentiation of cognitive structures coupled with a 
withdrawal of affect from its previous points of attachment.  In 
this process, the susceptible subject is pressed to become 
'deautomatized' (Deikman 1969), hyperaware of the role of 
conditioning and the plasticity of the self, while 
simultaneously stimulated to emotionally charged abreactions 
which are mirrored and magnified by the group and the leader, 
who represents the sacred group founder.  These deconditioning' 
exercises are obviously not aimed at promoting adaption to 
'ordinary unhappiness’ (Freud's claim for psychotherapy), but 
rather to the revelation of a deeper, transcendent inner self no 
longer bound by the chains of culture or context, nor by the 
stimulus-response mechanisms of the mind. Instead, "you take 
responsibility.... in effect you have freely chosen to do 
everything that you have ever done and to be precisely what you 
are.  In that instant you become exactly what you  
always wanted to be" (Brewer 1975). 
 For participantsxxxvi, this inner self is not a matter of 
conjecture or theory.  It is really experienced in the 
effervescence of the collective - just as Durkheim hypothesized.  
The combination of an undermining of personal identity, 
systematic devaluation and confusion of ordinary thought, the 
stimulation of heightened abreactive emotions detached from 
original causes within the context of the mirroring group and 
under the protection of a god-like leader act together to 
provide expansive sensations of catharsis for those who are 
carried away by the techniques of collective ecstasy.  
 The individual participating in this experience is likely 
to attribute his or her feelings of expansion to the doctrine 
and the leader.  The 'perfect self' that is then revealed when 
personal identity is stripped away is, more often than not, a 
self modeled after the charismatic group exemplar.   A new 
identity then replaces that which has been abandoned as 
inauthentic - an identity legitimated by the intensity of the 
emotion generated in the altered state of consciousness of the 
ecstatic group context - but one which, in consequence, can only 
exist within this extraordinary situationxxxvii.  In other words, 
despite appearances of pragmatism, the world-affirming group is 
likely to develop into a node of collective effervescence that 
stands in opposition to the larger rationalized social 
organization, which is experienced as 'dead' and alienating. The 
next step is to try to make the world replicate the group; this 
is the road toward Messianism and paranoia. 
Conclusion 
 Two points are especially worth reiterating here. The 
first is the repeated use of techniques aimed at demonstrating 
that the recruit is not an autonomous individual, but rather is 
'programmed' and 'conditioned' by history, culture, and family.  
This revelation, engendered in a highly charged group context 
under the authority of an apparently powerful authority figure, 
is crucial in stimulating the emotional abreaction that helps 
lead the subject into collective participation.  It is, it seems 
to me, an anthropological fact of considerable importance that 
persons in this culture can be transformed by discovering that 
their lives are not totally autonomous and that their identities 
are not completely self-manufactured.  The efficacy of this 
technique is, quite evidently, closely related to the prevalent 
American capitalist social organization and its accompanying 
ideology of possessive individualism and purposive agency. 
 A connected point is that members of a configuration with 
such an ideological and social structure are highly susceptible 
to a covert hunger for the collective experience offered by 
charismatic immersion.  As I have argued elsewhere (1990), when 
the feeling self is stripped of identity markers and significant 
emotional ties with others, and simultaneously affirmed as the 
sole source of action and preference, then the intensity and 
certainty of charismatic  revelation will be extremely 
attractive, since participation in a charismatic group offers 
precisely the emotional gratification, self-loss and affirmation 
of a transcendent identity that the predominant social model of 
reality precludes. 
 However, because such movements are in conflict with the 
ruling order of thought, they must take on extreme forms.  
Charisma becomes not a moment, but eternal; the god is no longer 
manifested occasionally in an otherwise ordinary mortal, but the 
vehicle has to be holy all the time.  So, paradoxically, a 
culture founded on the 'standard' consciousness of rationality 
and individual agency renders even more fervid and impetuous the 
expression of the altered state of awareness Weber called 
'charisma'. 
 To summarize, in this essay I have argued that 'meaning-
centered' interpretive analysis is in fact located within a 
tradition that assumes as its basic premise the rationality of 
maximizing individual actors.  This perspective is not adequate 
for understanding forms of social action that are outside the 
realm of rationality - a point recognized by Weber himself in 
his discussion of tradition and charisma.  
 Here I have sketched very lightly, with plenty of room 
for contradiction and dispute, some alternative views on 
irrationality, using the works of Weber, Durkheim, Le Bon and 
Tarde to argue that processes of charismatic involvement, 
collective effervescence, and crowd psychology may help us grasp 
the basic pattern of such apparently irrational action and to 
place it a framework of theoretical knowledge.  Far too rapidly, 
I've applied this framework to the actual trajectories of two 
new religions, showing how their evolution and their mode of 
recruitment fit within it. 
 The final question is perhaps whether this mode of 
approach is  applicable only for understanding cultic groups at 
the periphery of social life, or whether it might have some 
relevance for more mainstream medical practitioners and 
psychiatrists.  I contend the latter is the case.   For example, 
if we believe, with Durkheim, that human society is built upon 
an emotional experience of selflessness within the transcendent 
group, what then happens when the increasing dominance of the 
competitive economy and the worship of the individual make such 
experiences less and less likely to occur, or even to be 
imagined?  One result might be the charisma hunger mentioned 
above, and the escalating excesses of charismatic groups.  But 
the more prevalent result may be the appalling number of 
complaints about depression, deadness and detachment among 
psychiatric patients in the US, coupled with fevered efforts to 
stimulate some sense of vitality through various forms of 
addiction and thrill seeking. These may be the prices paid for 
the absence of any felt sense of connection to the social world. 
 





                                                            
i I am not claiming that Westerners only have positive evaluations of 
instrumental rationality; 'sincere' emotion is also highly valued. However, 
sincere feelings do not come from the mind, but from the heart. 
ii The 'ideal type' is a formal conceptual model to be  
used as a lens for viewing variations in real social configurations in order 
to make comparisons.  This implies that 'rational' social formations are in 
actual fact never fully rational, but always have 'traditional' and 
'charismatic' elements within them, even though these elements may be 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
suppressed or denied.  And, of course, the reverse is also the case.  For 
more on Weber's methodology, see Weber 1949. 
iii Instrumental rationality - the rationality typical of modernity and 
capitalism - is characterized by the most efficient use of means to reach an 
end.  Value rationality - the rationality of premodern societies - envisions 
means as ends, with efficiency taking second place to proper modes of 
behavior.  The complexities and ambiguities of this distinction are many, and 
the boundaries of the categories are by no means clear, but what is relevant 
here is simply that both types of social action, whatever their differences 
and similarities, involve conscious choices and acts aimed at maximizing 
valued goals. 
iv Interestingly, Weber foresaw just such a hive-like future for rational man.  
Utmost rational efficiency will lead, he feared, to a rigid and immobile 
bureaucratic and technocratic social system. 
v See Weber 1978: 242, 400-3, 535-6, 554, 1112, 1115. 1972: 279, 287 for the 
relationship between charismatic revelation and ecstatic states of 
excitement. 
vi The conjunction between epilepsy and charisma seems odd given our modern 
medical conception of grand-mal and petit-mal epileptic seizures as 
electrical storms in the brain that eliminate consciousness while causing 
gross motor convulsions.   But Weber's model (one common to his era) broadly 
imagined epileptic - or, more properly, epileptoid - seizures as closely akin 
to hypnotic states and to hysterical fits (see Thornton 1976, Massey and 
McHenry 1986 for more on this connection).  Our modern counterpart might be 
the category of dissociation.   However, it is also worth noting that 
Winkelman (1986), among others, has argued for a parallel between shamanic 
dissociation, temporal lobe epilepsy, and other forms of what Sacks (1985) 
has called mental superabundances, or disorders of excess, in which 
sensations of energy and vitality become morbid, and illness presents itself 
as euphoria.   An example is Dostoyevsky, who writes, "You all, healthy 
people, can't imagine the happiness which we epileptics feel during the 
second before our fit... I don't know if this felicity lasts for seconds, 
hours or months, but believe me,  I would not exchange it for all the joys 
that life may bring!"  (quoted in Sacks 1985: 137). 
 We might also recall that cross-cultural studies of shamanism do in 
fact show strong incidence of overtly epileptoid manifestations such as 
trembling and convulsions, especially in the early stages of shamanic 
initiation.  Evidently there may be both a predisposition and an element of 
imitation and training at work in achieving shamanic trance, and the trance 
itself may have a considerable overlap with some mild forms of disturbance of 
the temporal lobe. 
vii "Ecstasy was also produced by the provocation of hysterical or epileptoid 
seizures among those with predispositions toward such paroxysms, which in 
turn produced orgiastic states in others" (Weber 1978: 535). 
viii Characteristically, Weber's own intellectual concern is with typologizing 
and contextualizing the novel ethical meaning systems provoked by the 
prophet's revelations.  He notes that the prophet himself may believe the new 
meaning system is his major contribution.  But Weber clearly states that for 
the masses, and especially for the impoverished, the prophet remains a 
charismatic with transcendent powers; the commitment of these followers is 
not to ideas, but to the prophet's person and his promise of immediate 
experiential salvation (Weber 1978: 467, 487). 
ix Levi-Strauss (1967) takes a similar position, but with a very different 
analytical point. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
x "Under the technical and social conditions of rational culture, an imitation 
of the life of Buddha, Jesus, or Francis seems condemned to failure for 
purely external reasons" (Weber 1972:357). 
xi See Greenfeld (1985) for a good statement of the distinction between 
primary and secondary charisma; though she too assumes as the essential 
driving force an orientation for building meaning. 
xii As Harriet Whitehead writes, "cultural anthropology has chosen the 
conservative route of merely noting that religious practices seem to have 
some intensifying or disordering effect upon experience, and retreating back 
into the realm of culturally organized meaning manipulation" (1987: 105).  In 
Weberian terms, this 'retreat' has an 'elective affinity' for intellectuals, 
because it is founded on an assertion of the absolute value and importance of 
the scholarly professional faith in the primacy of reason and the possibility 
of approaching meaning through interpretation. 
xiii Weber profoundly regretted his own incapacity to experience the compulsion 
of charisma, he lamented the decline of the ecstatic, and he longed for the 
advent of "entirely new prophets" who would bring, through their very 
presence, an escape from "the iron cage" of rational action without 
transcendent content that he envisioned as the inevitable and unhappy future 
of humanity (Weber 1958:181-2). 
xiv See, for example, Meeker, who portrays Durkheim as believing "science 
would eventually prove fully adequate as a replacement for religion" (1990: 
62), and who castigates him for his supposed dismissal of "human dreams and 
wishes" in favor of the apotheosis of an abstract emblem.  Meeker here 
ignores Durkheim's emphasis on passion and desire in the construction of the 
elementary forms of religious life. 
xv "We do not admit that there is a precise point at which the individual 
comes to an end and the social realm commences.... we pass without interval 
from one order of facts to the other" (Durkheim 1966: 313). 
xvi In taking this perspective, Durkheim prefigures Freud, but with an 
entirely reversed moral viewpoint.  And, of course, the influence of Rousseau 
and the Comptean vision of a revolutionary sociology are very strong indeed 
in Durkheim's apotheosis of society. 
xvii Durkheim argues in an important footnote that the realm of the economy, 
where the maximizing rational individual holds sway, is the only arena of 
social life that is in essence completely opposed to the sacred.  The 
dominance of the economy in modern culture is therefore destructive of the 
moral bonds of society (1965: 466). Note how different his project is from 
Weber's, who aimed to show the ways in which various prophecies favor or 
oppose the rise of capitalism. 
xviii As Moscovici writes, the hypnotic state was envisioned in late 19th 
century French culture as "that strange drug which... releases the individual 
from his solitude and carries him off to a world of collective intoxication" 
(1985: 92).  As already noted, hypnotism and epilepsy were thought to be 
similar in nature.  The idea and experience of hypnotism and allied 
dissociated states was a romantic counter to Utilitarian individualism, and 
had a strong influence on social and psychological thought, as well as 
literature and the arts, in the late 19th and early 20th century. 
xix The similarity to Weber's 'objectless acosmism of love'is evident. 
xx For this reason, Durkheim can make the seemingly paradoxical claim that 
"despotism is nothing more than inverted communism" (1984: 144). 
xxi This image continues to prevail in medical theories of 'mass hysteria'. 
See Bartholomew (in press) for a compendium of examples.  Bartholomew's paper 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
is also an example of the interpretive attempt to validate all apparently 
irrational action by demonstrating its meaningfulness and intent within a 
cultural context. 
xxii The tropes of the 'feminine', 'savage', 'childish' crowd are painfully 
clear indicators of the anxiety felt by these men over a  possible loss of 
control and over the weakness of their masculine, civilized, adult personnas.  
An interesting, if obvious, analysis could be made of these metaphors, which 
relate to the changing political climate of France and heightened fear of 
lower class rebellion.  What I wish to stress here, however, is the structure 
of the argument. 
xxiii Awareness makes no difference to this existential condition.  "If the 
photographic plate became conscious at a given moment of what was happening 
to it, would the nature of the phenomenon be essentially changed" (Tarde: 
xiv)? 
xxiv As Tarde writes, "volition, together with emotion and conviction, is the 
most contagious of psychological states.  An energetic and authoritative man 
wields an irresistible power over feeble natures.  He gives them the 
direction which they lack.  Obedience to him is not a duty, but a need…. 
Whatever the master willed, they will; whatever the apostle believes or has 
believed, they believe" (1903: 198). 
xxv Although the leader's appeal is irrational, it has certain pattern, and Le 
Bon gained much of his fame as a modern Machiavelli, telling rulers how to 
hold the reins of power in the new Age of the Crowd through the use of 
emotionally charged theatricality, large gestures, dramatic illusions and the 
rhetoric of myth.  According to Le Bon, the modern leader's technique must be 
"to exaggerate, to affirm, to resort to repetitions, and never attempt to 
prove anything by reasoning" (Le Bon 1952: 51).  Le Bon's instructions have 
been taken seriously by many demagogues, including Hitler, who cited him 
extensively in Mein Kampf.  
xxvi Those who believe that Nazi devotees and leaders were motivated by either 
value or instrumental rationality should consider work by Robert Waite (1977) 
and Ian Kershaw (1987), as well as  Joachim Fest's biography of Hitler 
(1974), and the numerous biographies of dedicated Nazis.  For more on this, 
see Lindholm 1990: 93-116. 
xxvii The intellectual debt of much contemporary anthropological theory to 
existential and phenomenological thought cannot be adequately pursued here,  
but particularly noteworthy is an emphasis on 'authenticity' and a refusal to 
make comparisons - both derived from premises of the priority of a unique 
inner self-consciousness struggling to free itself from what Heidegger (1962) 
called the tyranny of 'the they.' The Western character of these premises is, 
I hope, evident. 
xxviii See Lindholm (1990) for a theoretical framework, and for analysis of more 
extreme cases of modern charisma: Nazism, the Manson Family, and Jim Jones's 
Peoples Temple.  
xxix The term is used by Roy Wallis to distinguish these positive movements 
from apocalyptic and millennial 'world rejecting' movements such as Jonestown 
(Wallis 1984). 
xxx The material is taken from sources which rely both on the testimony of 
converts and of those who have 'deconverted'.  On the question of the moral 
stance of the informant, and its influence on the data, see the Appendix in 
Wallis (1984).  Here, I have used material that is corroborated by sources 
both within and without the movements. 
xxxi Hubbard was officially reported dead in 1986, but he had not been seen in 
public for many years, and may have died sometime previously (see Lamont 1986 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
for an account).  The difficulty of maintaining a charismatic organization 
after the death of the leader is probably one cause of the reluctance to 
admit his death. 
xxxii Erhard has subsequently resigned some of his positions of authority in 
the organization. 
xxxiii These methods have been substantially altered as each organization moves 
through the cycle of charismatic routinization and then again attempts to 
restimulate fervor among the disciples.  The examples used here date from the 
most expansive and charismatic phase of this process. 
xxxiv See Bainbridge and Stark (1980), who argue that the lack of any real 
content in 'clear' status and the constantly shifting Scientology doctrine 
actually enhanced Scientology's hold over its converts.  
xxxv Erhard, a postmodernist before his time, has commented that "there are 
only two things in the world, semantics and nothing" (quoted in Martin 1980: 
114). 
xxxvi I should note that of course not all participants prove to be equally 
susceptible to the lure of the group.  Innumerable differences in personal 
and cultural background and circumstances will make a difference in the 
degree to which any individual will be likely to participate.  But under the 
right conditions, it is also very possible that even the most resistant 
individual might be caught up in the compelling dynamic of a charismatic 
collective. 
xxxvii Bainbridge (1978) has called this process "social implosion," that is, 
the development of a tight knot of persons, interacting solely with one 
another, bound by powerful feelings of loyalty and of separateness from the 
rest of society.  
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